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MS. BARTLETT:# Good afternoon.
For those of you who were not here this morning, I am Kathy
Bartlett. I am the Symposium Editor of the Fordham Intellectual
Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal (IPLJ). On
behalf of the entire Journal, I would like to welcome you to our
third panel discussion and extend my sincere thanks to our
distinguished guest speakers for being here. I look forward to what
I hope will be another lively discussion.
It is my pleasure to introduce Professor Joel Reidenberg, who
will be moderating this panel. Professor Reidenberg is a Professor
of Law at Fordham University School of Law, where he has been
teaching since 1990. He has written numerous English and French
publications on information technology law and policy, and we are
very grateful for his participation.
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: Thank you, Kathy.
Welcome to our panel this afternoon. I will probably be a
somewhat less interventionist moderator than my colleague a little
bit earlier, but I fear I may get drawn into the fray. Our panel topic
is essentially—I will use the second phrase of the title—Should the
First Amendment Ever Come Second? In looking at the panelists
who will speak this afternoon and seeing their backgrounds, we
find a diverse set of issues that this panel can address, ranging
from filtering to intellectual property concerns.
I think one common theme among the different topics is the
confrontation between the First Amendment and an Information
Society. If we look at the trend, both in the U.S. as well as
globally over the past twenty years, we have moved from a
services to an information-based economy.
It is in that context that we see the First Amendment. The First
Amendment is usually thought of as the quintessential rule for

free speech, privacy and freedom of information on the Internet, and has written several
law review articles on these issues.
#
Kathy Bartlett, Symposium Editor, Fordham Intellectual Property, Media, and
Entertainment Law Journal, Fordham University School of Law; B.F.A., summa cum
laude, Jacksonville University, 1981; M.F.A., University of South Florida, 1986; J.D.
expected, Fordham University School of Law, 2003.
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freedom of speech,1 but it is really about free flows of information
and regulating—or, rather, not regulating—the flows of
information. If the First Amendment is, in effect, a general rule of
immunity granting unfettered flows of information, we confront
the problems that are apparent today; essentially, how do we go
about regulating a society that is information-based? If the First
Amendment constrains us in our ability to regulate information
flows, do we wind up with a society that is lawless and reckless, or
do we figure out ways in which we can structure information flows
in society consistent with the First Amendment? I hope we can
illuminate these questions today in the context of some specific
examples.
The ultimate irony, which I was telling one of the panelists just
before we started, is the title Should the First Amendment Ever
Come Second? I worry at times that if we cannot figure out ways
of setting boundaries for certain kinds of nefarious activity taking
place on the Internet, then perhaps the Second Amendment might
come first. Think about that.
This afternoon we have a tremendous group of panelists.
Seated in front of you are the players in the debate, whether in the
public policy fora, the courts or the Congress.
We will start with Ann Beeson, who is the Litigation Director
of the Technology and Liberty Program at the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU). Ann has been very active in the field.
She was the lead counsel in Ashcroft v. ACLU,2 which was the
challenge to the Child Online Protection Act;3 and counsel for the
plaintiffs in Reno v. ACLU,4 which is the case that struck down a
portion of the Communications Decency Act.5 Ann is recognized
1

See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628–29 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Constitution is premised upon the theory that the
marketplace of ideas is the best way to achieve the ultimate truth and that freedom of
speech must only be limited where there is a “present danger of immediate evil”);
Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (holding that the freedom of speech and
press clauses of the First Amendment are intended to guard against prior restraints on
publication).
2
535 U.S. 564 (2002).
3
Child Online Protection Act [COPA], 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2000).
4
521 U.S. 844 (1997).
5
Communications Decency Act [CDA], 47 U.S.C. § 223.
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as one of the Top Fifty Women Litigators in the country by the
National Law Journal.6 We are delighted to have her start this
afternoon.
MS. BEESON: Thanks.
I just want to talk a little bit about two different lawsuits that I
am involved in directly at the moment.
The first one is a constitutional challenge to the Children’s
Internet Protection Act (CIPA).7 That is the law that actually
mandates that every public library in the country use Internet filters
on all of their Internet access computers.8 The name of the case is
American Library Ass’n v. United States.9
The other case I want to talk about briefly—and I want to talk
about how these two cases are related—is one that we recently
filed in the District of Massachusetts, called Edelman v. N2H2,10
which involves, in part, a constitutional challenge to provisions of
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).11
I think there are two themes in what I want to say. First of all,
one of the themes is to see how it is that restrictions on the use of
copyrighted works can be used to reinforce, and in some cases to
justify, censorship in other ways, and, in particular, mandate a
filtering technology. The second theme, I think, would be that
even though all of the proponents of legislation like the DMCA
have said that the primary purpose of it—and I do believe that their
6

Margaret Cronin Fisk, Women at the Top: Fifty Litigators Who Succeed In and Out
of the Courthouse, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 17, 2001, at C2.
7
Children’s Internet Protection Act [CIPA], 47 U.S.C. § 254.
8
See Am. Library Ass’n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 407 (E.D. Pa. 2002)
(“CIPA requires that libraries, in order to receive [Library Services and Technology Act
(LSTA)] funds or E-rate discounts, certify that they are using a ‘technology protection
measure’ that prevents patrons from accessing ‘visual depictions’ that are ‘obscene,’
‘child pornography,’ or in the case of minors, ‘harmful to minors.’”) (quoting 20 U.S.C. §
9134(f)(1)(A) (2000) (LSTA); 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(B), (C) (E-rate)), prob. juris. noted,
123 S. Ct. 551 (2002) .
9
Id.
10
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Edelman v. N2H2, Inc. (D. Mass.
filed July 25, 2002) (No. 02-CV-11503), http://archive.aclu.org/court/edelman.pdf.
11
Digital Millennium Copyright Act [DMCA], Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(1988) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 512, 1201–1205, 1301–1322 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 4001).

6 - PANEL III FORMAT

2003]

5/12/03 8:39 AM

SHOULD THE FIRST AMENDMENT EVER COME SECOND?

835

intention is honorable—is to protect copyright,12 in fact many
provisions of the law have been very explicitly used to allow
companies to hide flaws in their technological programs and in
their work.13 You will see how this plays out again in this
particular debate.
I want to first explain, just to give you a sense, because I hope
at least that there are some students in the room, of just how
complicated litigation is and how hard it is to develop evidence in
our cases.
Some of you may know that before the federal challenge to the
federal filtering law, there was an earlier challenge to a local policy
in Loudoun County, Virginia, which required Internet filters on all
the terminals in the Loudoun County Public Library.14 We were
also the lawyers in that case. That was the first time that we had to
figure out how in the world we were going to prove to the court
that these filters necessarily blocked access to a wide range of
valuable speech on the Internet.
We did it in that case through a range of anecdotal evidence,
which was not, frankly, very overwhelming. We were only able to
come up with anecdotal examples of the kinds of sites that were
blocked by the programs.15 We won that case and it didn’t go any
further than the district court.16
After that case was decided, we began to see that this issue of
mandated filters in public libraries was going to be a major First
Amendment issue across the country, because we started seeing
more and more local libraries decide to filter. So we embarked on

12

See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 105-190, pt. 1, at 1–2 (1998) (The DMCA “will provide
certainty for copyright owners and Internet service providers with respect to copyright
infringement liability online.”); H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, at 9 (1998) (“[T]he law must
adapt in order to make digital networks safe places to disseminate and exploit
copyrighted works.”).
13
See Am. Civil Liberties Union [ACLU], In Legal First, ACLU Sues over New
Copyright
Law,
ACLU
Archives,
at
http://archive.aclu.org/issues/cyber/
Edelman_N2H2_feature.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2003).
14
Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. of the Loudoun County Library, 24 F. Supp. 2d
552 (E.D. Va. 1998).
15
Id. at 557–61.
16
Id. at 570.
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a more major project to document how filters were blocking access
to sites, and particularly in libraries around the country.
Before the federal filtering law was passed, we were actually
very close to filing three simultaneous lawsuits against local
Internet filtering policies in Alaska, Georgia, and Michigan.17 I
was actually quite disappointed that the CIPA was passed because
it ruined my vacation to Alaska, which I didn’t get to take because
we didn’t file the lawsuit.
We again faced this problem—what are we going to put in as
expert testimony on over-blocking? We did a lot of searching
around. We found a quite young, but also quite brilliant,
researcher who is affiliated with the Berkman Center at Harvard.18
We sat down with him, and we asked what he could do to get us
much better evidence of just how flawed these programs are.
The first question that he asked was whether or not he could
just literally hack into the programs, reverse-engineer the
programs, and obtain a full copy of the list of sites that the
products block. We talked about that in detail. We realized that if
he did that, he would almost certainly be liable under the
provisions of the DMCA that prevent you from circumventing
access to a technological protection measure, and from creating a
tool that would help you in that process.19
And so we decided that we were too busy trying to figure out
how to litigate mandatory filters to also at that point file a
challenge to the DMCA, so we put that on a shelf for a little bit.
We, instead, then came up with a way to document over-blocking
which involved downloading literally every single site that Yahoo!
17

The ACLU joined with other organizations to bring a lawsuit challenging a Michigan
statute that added criminal prohibitions against using computers or the Internet to
disseminate sexually explicit materials to minors. See Cyberspace Communications, Inc.
v. Engler, 142 F. Supp. 2d 827 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
18
A complete biography of Ben Edelman and his work with The Berkman Center for
Internet and Society at Harvard Law School is available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/
edelman.html.
19
See 17 U.S.C § 1201(a)(1) (2000) (prohibiting circumvention of a “technological
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title”); id. §
1201(a)(2)(A) (prohibiting manufacturing or providing any “technology, product, service,
device, component, or part” designed to circumvent a technological measure that controls
access to a protected work).
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and Google had ever indexed, basically the entire index of sites
from Yahoo! and Google, and running those millions of sites
through four different major filtering products.20
It took him many, many, many hours to do this research. We
had to pay him a lot of money to do it. He actually made, I think,
significantly more money than I did as a lawyer for the ACLU, and
he hadn’t even gotten his college diploma yet—which our friends
at the Justice Department made a big deal out of in the trial court,
and which actually backfired. Too bad you weren’t there, Jake.
You would have been amused by it.
MR. LEWIS: I’m not the trial attorney.
MS. BEESON: No, he’s not.
Anyway, Ben’s research, of course, still did not by any means
document every single site that this product wrongly blocks, for a
whole number of reasons that are discussed in the opinion of the
three-judge court that heard the case,21 which of course includes
the fact that the search engines do not even begin to reach all of the
sites on the Internet.
Because he had to come up with some assumptions about how
to determine when a site was wrongly blocked, his definition was
that the site was wrongly blocked if Yahoo! categorized it as a
government site and N2H2 categorized it as pornography. That
was a sign that something was wrong and that one of the two
classification systems had wrongly categorized it.
He came up with over 4,000 sites, which we submitted on CDROM to the court,22 that were very clearly improperly classified.
You know, this is always the most enjoyable part of these talks. I
can never resist the urge to give a couple of examples. There are
many, many, but some of them are just such fun.
20

See Expert Report of Benjamin Edelman, Multnomah County Pub. Library v. United
States, (E.D. Pa. 2002) (No. 01-CV-1322), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/edelman/
pubs/aclu-101501.pdf. Edelman investigated four major filtering products, SurfControl
Cyber Patrol 6, N2H2 Internet Filtering 2.0, Secure Computing SmartFilter 3.0, and
Websense Enterprise 4.3. See id.
21
See Am. Library Ass’n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 427–31, 446–47 (E.D.
Pa. 2002), prob. juris. noted, 123 S. Ct. 551 (2002).
22
See id. at 442–43; Expert Report of Edelman at 23–26, Multnomah County Pub.
Library (No. 01-CV-1322).
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Orphanage Emmanuel,23 which is a Christian orphanage in
Honduras, was blocked by Cyber Patrol as “adult sexually
explicit.” The home page of a Buddhist nun was categorized as
nudity by N2H2.24 A Danish anti-death penalty site categorized as
pornography—I think that’s kind of funny, because if it had been a
pro-death penalty site, I, as an ACLU lawyer, might have
categorized that as pornography, but an anti-death penalty site,
hard to see.25 The Sydney University Australian football team—
now who knows what was really there, but SmartFilter categorized
it as sex.26 Anyway, the list goes on and on, as I say, there are lots
of examples.
Again, though, this is not at all quantitative research. It does
not show what percentage of the time, for example, these products
improperly classify things. For that reason, Ben’s research was
ongoing, even after we finished the evidence and the filtering case
was decided.
He is currently looking into how foreign
governments are using filters to block access specifically to
political sites and to anti-religious sites in some cases. For that
reason, even after we won the filtering case at the district court
level, he wanted to go on with his research.
He came back to us and asked if we would represent him in a
challenge to N2H2. He wanted to obtain a copy of their full list.
But if he did that, he may be liable under the DMCA. And so we
filed the suit in Massachusetts.27
Just to wind up, before I go on to the N2H2 suit, what
happened in the filtering case, was the court found that the
evidence showed that the products in evidence blocked a wide
range of protected speech.28 The court also found that was
inevitable because the very nature of these software programs was
such that they could never become perfect enough to distinguish
between what is protected speech and what is unprotected
23

See Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 446–47.
See id.
25
See id.
26
See id.
27
See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Edelman v. N2H2, Inc. (D.
Mass. filed July 25, 2002) (No. 02-CV-11503), http://archive.aclu.org/court/edelman.pdf.
28
See Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 446–49.
24
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speech.29 The case is now in front of the Supreme Court, which
will probably decide next week whether or not it will take
jurisdiction over the case.30 It is widely expected that it will, so it
will probably be heard sometime in the spring.
In July we filed a lawsuit against N2H2.31 That lawsuit asks
for a couple of things. It is a declaratory judgment action. It asks
the court, first, to interpret provisions of the DMCA to have some
kind of fair use exception, which is not at all clear from any of the
earlier case law on the DMCA; and find, in particular, that Ben’s
reverse-engineering of the N2H2 program would be
constitutionally protected fair use.32
It also asks to declare the N2H2 licensing agreement to be
unenforceable.33 That is another very interesting, separate issue,
which has serious First Amendment implications, because of
course the N2H2 license specifically prohibits Ben, the computer
researcher, from reverse-engineering the program.34 That is
becoming a very common way that owners of software programs
try to extend their property rights much further than the law itself
would normally allow.
I think I am going to stop there, because I know I am going
over, and I am sure you will have a lot of questions.
But again, the relationship between these two cases just shows
that, first of all, with respect to the DMCA, it is not just kids
wanting access to DVDs that is at issue. The issue is whether or
not very serious computer researchers can investigate, and analyze
and publish, their research documenting flaws in programs that the
public has a very strong concern in learning the accuracy of.
That’s all.
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: Thank you.

29

See id at 410.
See United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 123 S. Ct. 551 (2002) (noting probable
jurisdiction).
31
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Edelman (No. 02-CV-11503)
32
See id. at 27.
33
See id. at 27–28.
34
See id. at 20.
30
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This shows, I think, a very interesting area of linkage related to
some of the open questions with the DMCA.
Edelman had not yet been challenged, had he?
MS. BEESON: What do you mean? Had they threatened to
sue him?
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: Right.
MS. BEESON: They had done several things, which I didn’t
get into. It is very clear that N2H2 intends to enforce its property
rights against him, and they have said that in their latest 10-Q.35 I
was going to read the language. It actually says in their latest
filing with the SEC that they intend to assert all of their legal rights
against Edelman if he violates the agreement or their proprietary
rights.36
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: That’s under a licensing
agreement, but not under the DMCA.
MS. BEESON: No, no. Under both. Under every single—
MR. SIMS: But none of that is a threat to sue under the
DMCA.
MS. BEESON: Well, they make it quite clear that they will use
all available legal remedies, not just the licensing agreement.
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: The DMCA, though, has two
interesting exemptions from the anti-circumvention provision.
One is that it is permissible to hack to disable software that is
trying to collect personal information.37 The other is the
exemption for trying to discover what the list is of blocked web

35
See N2H2, Inc., SEC Form 10-Q for Quarter Ending June 30, 2002 (“We intend to
defend the validity of our license agreement and to enforce the provisions of this
agreement to protect our proprietary rights. We also intend to assert all of our legal rights
against Mr. Edelman if he engages in future activity that violates the agreement or our
proprietary
rights.”),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1077301/
000089102002001251/v83748e10vq.htm.
36
See id.
37
See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(i) (2000) (permitting circumvention where the technological
measure is capable of “collecting or disseminating personally identifying
information . . .”).
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sites in filtering programs.38 In essence, the DMCA, which was
designed for intellectual property protection, now confronts
privacy issues and creates exceptions. The scope of these
exceptions is going to be very important for someone like
Edelman, trying to put together these lists of blocked programs.
You can also ask the question, if only these 4,000 obscure sites
were identified as being blocked, how significant is that blocking?
How significant a censorship is that, compared to the harm that
might be sought in avoidance by the mandate that filtering be
imposed?
We will turn now to Jacob Lewis, who might have a different
view of filtering. Mr. Lewis is the Appellate Litigation Counsel in
the Civil Division at the Department of Justice. He is a graduate of
Harvard College and Harvard Law School, but we won’t hold that
against him. He has defended the constitutionality of the Child
Online Protection Act and was one of the attorneys involved in the
defense of the Children’s Internet Protection Act.39
MR. LEWIS: Thank you.
Before I say anything, because David Carson went through this
process earlier, these are my own views. I have to give the
standard disclaimer. When the Justice Department makes a filing
in court, it really is an enormous institutional process. The
language that is in our briefs, and in this case the jurisdictional
statements, say, in the American Library Association case, is the
product of a number of minds, many of which are greater than
mine, that actually come up with the government’s position.40 So
anything I say that is different from those filings should not be held
against the government in a later filing as a “gotcha!” Obviously, I
have a fair amount of background and thinking on these kinds of
issues, and I hope to give you the benefit of that, but to the extent
that, either advertently or inadvertently, I diverge from the
38

See id. § 1201(g) (permitting circumvention to conduct “good faith encryption
research . . .”).
39
Mr. Lewis was a member of the litigation team that defended the CIPA from the
ACLU’s contention that it violated free speech guarantees. See ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d
162 (3d Cir. 2000).
40
See Brief for the United States, United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d
401 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (No. 02-361), prob. juris. noted, 123 S. Ct. 551 (2002).
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government’s position, you should not confuse my statements with
the statements that the government has made in cases that have,
are, or will be in litigation.
To go back to the point of the 4,000 sites, that really is an
extremely important question. I think that Ben Edelman’s universe
of sites that he ran through to get the 4,000 was about 500,000.
But the point is that the Internet contains a vast number of web
sites. The three-judge district court in the American Library case
estimated one or two billion web pages, billions of unique web
sites.41 So it may be all too easy to find even thousands of sites
where it clearly seems that the blocking is off the wall. I am not
saying that any of the ones on the list are off the wall. There may
be justifications for them.
But assume for the moment that there were 4,000, and with
diligence you could find even a few more thousand. In the context
of the web, with millions and billions of web pages, that by itself
would not tell you that there is a significant amount of overblocking going on. In the context of this kind of lawsuit, which is
a facial challenge to the statute before it has been enforced without
any particulars, it does not tell you that, in the words of the legal
standard, that the statute is substantially overbroad.
One of the problems with any of this kind of litigation
involving the Internet is the Internet is so vast that numbers which
in isolation appear to be large may not be large when compared
against the world of the Internet.
Second, Ann talks about the Children’s Internet Protection Act
as “mandating” filtering in public libraries. But the Act is actually
a condition of federal funding.42 The public libraries are free not
to take the funds that are under the particular federal programs. In
fact, I am not quite sure of the exact figures, but my understanding

41

See Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 419 (stating that “a figure of 2 billion is a
reasonable estimate of the number of Web pages that can be reached . . . by standard
search engines”), prob. juris. noted, 123 S. Ct. 551 (2002).
42
See 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(A)(i) (2000) (describing the “[r]equirements for certain
libraries with computers having Internet access”).
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is that federal funding as a percentage of total funding of public
libraries is quite a small amount.43
In any event, the freedom is there. If any particular public
library does not like the condition on the statutory programs that
provide funding for Internet-connected computers they do not have
to take the money. The condition then goes away, it is irrelevant
so far as they are concerned.
I can’t really speak to the N2H2 litigation. I know there is a
challenge lurking somewhere in there to the constitutionality of the
DMCA. If that ripens, probably a trial branch at the Justice
Department will be getting involved, since the Department of
Justice defends the constitutionality of federal enactments.
I am grateful to be an appellate attorney. I only do courts of
appeals cases, so I get to either ride the momentum of a case that
goes well; or on occasion, maybe more than one occasion, pick up
the pieces, or try to pick up the pieces, after they have all fallen
apart below. In any case, there will be some time before the N2H2
case would even come up to my office.
On the other hand, the CIPA litigation has been through my
office and now the government’s appeal is before the Supreme
Court.44 My understanding is the Court was scheduled to consider
whether they would take the case today. Since the other parties to
the case have not really opposed the Court granting review, I
would be very surprised if the Court didn’t grant review.45
To my mind, the interesting thing about the library filtering
case, the CIPA litigation, is less the nuances of public forum
doctrine or the particulars of the blocking software, but the fact
that the case may actually turn to a large extent on what one views
as the nature and role of a public library.

43

See, e.g., Betsy Sywetz, Public Testimony Submitted for Spring 1999 Hearings by
the Regents Commission on Library Services, Huntington Station, N.Y., at
http://www.nysl.nysed.gov/rcols/tst-li.htm (May 19, 1999) (wherein New York’s Deputy
Director of the Office of Library Services notes that “Library service is generally
considered a local responsibility in the United States. . . . In New York State about 10%
of library funding comes from the State and less than 2% from the federal government.”).
44
See Am. Library Ass’n, 123 S. Ct. at 551 (noting probable jurisdiction).
45
See id.
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The district court ultimately determined that the standard by
which it was supposed to evaluate filtering’s effectiveness or these
technology protection measures that the statute requires is strict
scrutiny.46 In doing so, the court considered the public libraries’
connections to the Internet to be a public forum—a limited public
forum but a public forum nonetheless, and for various reasons the
court found strict scrutiny applied.47
But the district court acknowledged that it would not apply
strict scrutiny to a library’s traditional collection development
decisions.48 That is, public libraries—all libraries—have finite
budgets. They cannot buy or store every book, magazine, print, or
video that is created in the world, so they have to make decisions
about what to acquire, and indeed what to retain. So in the district
court’s view, the library must necessarily make a choice as to
whether to purchase, for example, books on gardening or books on
golf.49
At a later point, the district court wrote that with its “last $100”
a library could decide to buy “the complete works of Shakespeare”
rather than “the complete works of John Grisham”50—although in
the public library area it is usually the other way around. The
district court found that that kind of decision was subject to
rational basis review and did not really pose a First Amendment
problem.51
But when we look at library collection development decisions,
common sense tells us that public librarians often make all sorts of
decisions about what books to acquire on the basis of their content.
46

See Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 470 (The “Internet . . . presents unique
possibilities for promoting First Amendment values . . . [which,] in the context of the
provision of Internet access in public libraries, justify the application of heightened
scrutiny to content-based restrictions that might be subject to only rational review in
other contexts . . . .”).
47
See id. at 457 (“We are satisfied that when the government provides Internet access
in a public library, it has created a designated public forum.”).
48
See id. at 462 (“[W]e agree with the government that generally the First Amendment
subjects libraries’ content-based decisions about which print materials to acquire for their
collections to only rational review.”).
49
See id. at 408–09.
50
Id. at 462.
51
See id.
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The librarian can decide that a certain book is not as good as
another book, or that it is just plain wrong. Nothing in the First
Amendment requires a library to buy a book on alchemy or
extrasensory perception or that would demean persons because of
their race or ethnicity or religion. A librarian may choose to
acquire such a book, but the First Amendment would not require
the library to do so.
That traditional judgment is exercised where sexually explicit
materials are concerned. In the record in the case, the district court
acknowledged that very few public libraries collect the graphic
sexually explicit materials, such as XXX-rated videos or Hustler
magazine.52 The district court noted that, according to the OCLC
database, which is a database of 48,000 libraries worldwide, only
400 in the database, of all types of libraries everywhere in the
database, wherever they are located, even outside the country, only
400 were listed as carrying a subscription to Playboy magazine and
only eight to Hustler.53 So clearly, with regard to this what I
would call the off-line collection, the traditional print magazine
collection, there is this kind of entirely appropriate content-based
judgment going on.
The rules should be no different, it seems to me, where the
connection to the Internet is concerned. A library connects to the
Internet for the same reasons that it buys traditional materials, in
order to expand its collection. The fact that the library by
connecting to the Internet thereby has the potential to connect to all
of the Internet does not mean it has to connect to all of the Internet.
The fact is there are a limited number of terminals, there is a
limited amount of time, even with regard to an Internet connection.
Many libraries, if you go to the public library, may have a sign-up
sheet saying thirty minutes for time at the computer. There may be
a line of people waiting.54
52
53
54

See id. at 420.
See id. at 420 n.4.
The district court observed that:
Nearly every librarian who testified at trial stated that patrons’ demand for
Internet access exceeds the library’s supply of Internet terminals. Under such
circumstances, every time library patrons visit a Web site, they deny other
patrons waiting to use the terminal access to other Web sites. Just as the
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The record showed that libraries had dealt with that kind of
scarcity by, among other things, for example, excluding game
playing or banning email or access to chat rooms, in order to
presumably promote the most efficient use of terminals.55
Someone who is waiting to do research on a medical condition, for
example, is not going to be particularly happy if they are not able
to get to that computer before closing time because there is some
other patron who is engaged in extended email conversation, or is
looking up a fantasy football league, or whatever it might be.
The district court’s assumption was that the First Amendment
prohibits a library from making any kind of restriction on Internet
access.56 But just as the library can exercise traditional collection
judgment with regard to regular printed materials, it should be able
to do so with regard to sexually explicit materials on the Internet.
So when you look at what CIPA does, it encourages libraries to
exercise their judgment in a particular way—in other words, to
employ a technology protection device that would exclude child
pornography and obscenity, which are unprotected by the First
Amendment, and harmful-to-minors material so far as minors are
concerned.
The district court would have said that the libraries did not
have an ability to exercise that judgment to exclude that speech,
and so therefore the statute is unconstitutional because it is paying
libraries, in essence, to do something unconstitutional.
That meant, by the way, that the seven percent of libraries that
the district court found already employed filtering even before the
CIPA, were doing something that was presumably violating the
First Amendment.57
scarcity of a library’s budget and shelf space constrains a library’s ability to
provide its patrons with unrestricted access to print materials, the scarcity of
time at Internet terminals constrains libraries’ ability to provide patrons with
unrestricted Internet access . . . .
Id. at 465 n.25.
55
See id. at 422 (noting that the Fulton County Public Library “restricts access to the
Web sites of dating services” and the Tacoma Public Library “does not allow patrons to
use the library’s Internet terminals for personal email, for online chat, or for playing
games”).
56
See id. at 411.
57
See id. at 406.
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The district court also stated that filtering was a problem
because it involved connecting to the Internet and then excluding
various things.58 In contrast, in the district court’s view, with a
traditional library collection, a book comes in, you look at the
book, you see whether the book is okay, and then you either
acquire it or not.59
But that is not actually how things work even in the traditional
world. There are plenty of instances in which a librarian does not
review a book before it has been acquired. Indeed librarians
cannot physically read or review all the materials that come into
the library before the fact. Librarians have necessarily relied on
bibliographies and finding aids and book reviews—many of the
same kinds of things you might rely on in deciding whether to buy
a book in a bookstore.60
But public libraries also employ what are called approval plans,
in which a library signs up with a publisher or a wholesaler and
says, look, give us everything that comes in that you think is the
kind of stuff we collect. They might even give them some specific
instructions about the kinds of things they collect. And if they
have a problem with what comes in after they have looked at it,
they will send the material back.61
They might, for example, say John Grisham is absolute gold.
If he writes another book, we are taking whatever it is. And they
do not have to read the next Grisham in order to determine that it is
appropriate for the library. In fact, that book might never be
touched by human hands until the patron first takes it out.
By the same token, a library that receives a bequest of 5,000
books, say, even if they had the space on the shelves for it, is not
required to keep all those 5,000 books in its collection just because
they are free and they have space. The librarian can go through the
58

See id. at 421.
See id.
60
See id. (noting that “many librarians use selection aids, such as review journals and
bibliographies, as a guide to the quality of potential acquisitions”).
61
See id. (referring to the “use of third-party vendors or approval plans to acquire print
and video resources” and explaining that in “such arrangements third party vendors
provide materials based on the library’s description of its collection development
criteria”).
59
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books and decide which ones they want to take and, for example,
not to take the ones that may be sexually explicit.
The important point is that the library in all such cases
exercises judgment. The district court seemed to suggest that the
First Amendment prevented the library from having any judgment
in this area.62 But in fact this kind of judgment has traditionally
been employed by librarians to further First Amendment purposes.
Libraries are not just warehouses, they are places of guidance.
Libraries collect books so that you can go to the best book for your
purposes in the quickest way. Librarians can make the judgment
that there are certain types of books, certain kinds of books, that do
not further their purposes as well as other kinds of books.
That is the main point, maybe the most interesting point, and to
a large extent a non-legal point. In the end, the American Library
case may turn as much on a perception of matters outside legal
doctrine as it does on the nuances of the legal concepts that are at
issue.
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: Thank you. Very interesting
presentation.
In the comments that Ann and Jake have suggested to us, it
sounds like the case is turning in part on the quality of the
technology, and on the court’s understanding of what the
technology was and how it functioned. At the district level, the
court did not see connecting to the Internet as analogous to the
acquisitions decisions that a librarian traditionally makes.63 All of
62

Id.

See id. at 464–65.
While the First Amendment permits the government to exercise editorial
discretion in singling out particularly favored speech for subsidization or
inclusion in a state-covered forum, we believe that where the state provides
access to a ‘vast democratic forum’ . . . and then selectively excludes from the
forum certain speech on the basis of its content, such exclusions are subject to
strict scrutiny.

63
See id. at 462. The court found that the “central difference” between the use of
Internet filters and the editorial discretion exercised in choosing books for the library’s
collection is that
by providing patrons with even filtered Internet access, the library permits
patrons to receive speech on a virtually unlimited number of topics, from a
virtually unlimited number of speakers without attempting to restrict patrons’
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a sudden, the library did not need to make acquisition decisions
anymore.
If the technology blocked a couple of sites inaccurately
because the technology was not that refined, then it is the law that
is wrong, rather than the technology that needs to be fixed.
We may hear more about this relationship between the law’s
dictates and the technology’s capability coming from our next
speaker.
He is Lee Tien, the Senior Staff Attorney at the Electronic
Frontier Foundation (EFF).64 He specializes in the law and policy
of free speech and privacy. He served his undergraduate time at
Stanford and then at Boalt, where he received his law degree. He
has published on and litigated cases involving free speech and
Internet speech.
MR. TIEN: Thank you very much.
My talk today is going to be only obliquely related to the
previous speakers’ presentations.
When I looked at this subject, I thought: There isn’t a whole
hell of a lot that I could say about censorware or filtering that Ann
and Jake couldn’t talk about. So I am going to take a different
approach to the issue of the Internet and speech.
Eventually, this PowerPoint presentation will come up, but I
will go ahead and start, rather than wait until it does.
I have titled this talk Sex, Science, Harm, and the Internet. I
chose this very general idea to think about the different kinds of
harms that are associated with speech and our conceptions of or
assumptions about those harms.
Let’s start with the censorware example. You’ve got a kind of
harm there. In the white paper that EFF did for the National

access to speech that the library, in the exercise of its professional judgment,
determines to be particularly valuable.
Id.
64

The Electronic Frontier Foundation [EFF] is a donor-supported membership
organization dedicated to protecting digital rights. See http://www.eff.org (last visited
Apr. 9, 2003).
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Academy of Sciences,65 we argued that one of the bases for
censorware or for blocking software is the notion that sexual
images are “toxic material,” that simple exposure to sexual images
was in itself harmful.66 This is one of the basic paradigms of First
Amendment harm.
[Slide] Voila! Thank you.
Here, for instance, is a quote from the American Family Online
page, which sums up this idea of toxicity.67 So we have this idea
of exposure as harm.
[Slide] As we know from looking at the censorware cases,
censorware blocks a lot of other material. Here are some examples
that were called out in the CIPA decision.68
I think it is no surprise that when Ann constructed this case,
she made some very careful choices about who the plaintiffs would
be. Among these web and patron plaintiffs were people who were
either focused on disseminating or accessing scientific information,
such as about breast cancer, reconstructive breast surgery, that sort
of thing. So in this particular area, at least, we see a notion that the
scientific value of information acts almost as a trump, that is, there
is a high value to scientific speech.
[Slide] But in the First Amendment area, that is not the way
that science is uniformly looked at and exposure is not the only
kind of harm we deal with.
In the area of national security harm, harm is not due to “toxic”
exposure. It is a different kind of harm. For instance, simply
publishing the sailing dates of transports or the number and
65

EFF’s white paper was submitted as part of a congressionally commissioned study
on Tools and Strategies for Protecting Kids from Pornography and Their Applicability to
Other Inappropriate Internet Content performed by the National Research Council, a
division of the National Academy of Sciences. The study was eventually published as
YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE INTERNET (Dick Thornburgh & Herbert S. Lin eds.,
2002), available at http://bob.nap.edu/html/youth_internet.
66
Id.
67
“CAUTION . . . Pornography is dangerous, and viewing it (even for a moment) can
set off a terrible chain of events.” American Family Online, Help Desk, at
http://www.afo.net/help/filter.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2003).
68
Examples included information about breast cancer, sexually transmitted diseases,
and health/medical information about sex. See Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at
446–47.
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location of troops does not necessarily cause harm to those
exposed.69 The problem is that it reveals information that someone
might use to prevent something from happening.
Similarly, in the Bernstein case,70 which involved scientific
“exports” (publication) of encryption software, the government
was not claiming that encryption software was like a virus, that it
would directly cause harm, that the speech itself would in some
way be harmful; rather, the claim was that someone could use
encryption overseas in a way that was detrimental to the U.S.
interest.71
Now, the government argued that software was not really
speech. EFF argued that there was a very strong communicative
aspect to programs. So there again, we used the notion of science
as high-value speech to frame the publication of source code,
helped by the fact that our client, Professor Bernstein, was first a
graduate student and then a professor.72
[Slide] But now let’s turn to some of the other types of harm.
Another example, economic harm, is exemplified by the DMCA.73
Copyright law has always restricted some speech in order to
protect the economic interests of copyright holders. The DMCA
was enacted to strengthen that protection. Now, the anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA,74 which are at issue in the
Edelman75 case and also in a case that EFF litigated last year, the
Felten76 case, raise some serious questions of restrictions on
scientific speech.
69

See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (finding that “no one
would question but that a government might prevent . . . publication of the sailing dates
of transports or the number and location of troops”).
70
Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999), withdrawn, reh’g
granted, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999).
71
See Near, 283 U.S. at 716.
72
See Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1135.
73
See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2000).
74
See id. §§ 1201–1205.
75
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Edelman v. N2H2, Inc. (D. Mass.
filed July 25, 2002) (No. 02-CV-11503), http://archive.aclu.org/court/edelman.pdf.
76
Felten v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., No. CV-01-2669 (D.N.J. dismissed Nov.
28, 2001). See EFF, Frequently Asked Questions About Felten & USENIX v. RIAA
Legal Case, at http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/Felten_v_RIAA/faq_felten.html (last
visited Apr. 9, 2003) (giving background information about Felten).
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The technology anti-trafficking provisions not only make it
unlawful to disseminate technologies of circumvention, but they
also have very limited exceptions that actually curtail existing law
permitting reverse-engineering, such as under the Sega v. Accolade
fair use decision.77
So one of the questions we had in the Felten case, which we
hoped would be elucidated, was whether the Section 1201
provisions against technology should be read to include scientific
papers like that published by Professor Felten.78
Now, Professor Felten’s paper was based on something called
the SDMI Challenge.79 He and his research team looked at how
various watermarking and other related technologies of the music
industry could be defeated or beaten. This was part of a contest
where the recording industry actually invited people to go ahead
and do this kind of research, so there was no issue as to the legality
of the research team’s investigations. On the other hand, there
were questions as to whether or not he could publish the team’s
research results.
This case was ultimately dismissed on justiciability grounds,
largely because the recording industry, which had originally
threatened Professor Felten and his research team with a lawsuit if
they published the paper, ended up agreeing to permit the
publication of the paper.80 And so the threat was, as far as the
district court was concerned, withdrawn.81
[Slide] Now the last set of examples I want to examine has to
do with science and the post-9/11 era. We are seeing, obviously, a
lot of restrictions on scientific speech. This is not a topic that has
77

Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
See Felten, No. CV-01-2669.
79
The Secure Digital Music Initiative [SDMI] challenge was a contest set up by the
recording industry under the auspices of the Recording Industry Association of America
[RIAA], which asked “hackers” to circumvent a number of digital music security
technologies. See Cassandra Imfeld, Playing Fair with Fair Use? The Digital Millennium
Copyright Act’s Impact on Encryption Researchers and Academicians, 8 COMM. L. &
POL’Y 111, 136–38 (2003).
80
See Transcript of Motions Before Honorable Garrett E. Brown, United States District
Court Judge, Nov. 28, 2001, Felten (No. No. CV-01-2669), http://www.eff.org/IP/
DMCA/Felten_v_RIAA/20011128_hearing_transcript.pdf.
81
See id.
78
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gotten a lot of public press, although certainly the New York Times
has been covering this.82 But there is simply a lot of activity going
on in the higher levels of government and in academia that all
revolve around the question of how much of this stuff that you
ordinarily published in scientific journals really needs to be out
there83
MIT, for instance, has gone on record saying (in essence) that
they have been approached by many government contracting
officers to include provisions in R&D funding contracts that would
give government officials the power to decide that certain
information in the research was sensitive and could not be
disclosed. They are not going to accept that.84

82

See, e.g., William J. Broad, U.S. Is Tightening Rules on Keeping Scientific Secrets,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2002, § 1, at 1.
83
See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Judith Miller, Many Worry About Germ Attack, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 9, 2002, at A16 (noting that “a deep philosophical divide has emerged
between scientists and intelligence officials over whether to withhold scientific
information in the name of national security”).
84
See Conducting Research During the War on Terrorism: Balancing Openness and
Security: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Science, H.R. REP. NO. 107-809 (2002)
(testimony of Sheila Widnall, Institute Professor and Professor of Aeronautics and
Astronautics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology). Dr. Widnall explained that MIT
recommended
because there is no consistent understanding or definition of what would
constitute ‘sensitive’ information, MIT should continue its policy of not
agreeing to any sponsor’s contractual request that research results generated
during the course of a program be reviewed for the inadvertent disclosure of
‘sensitive’ information. Increasingly, MIT has seen the attempt by government
contracting officials to include a requirement that research results be reviewed,
prior to publication, for the potential disclosure of ‘sensitive’ information. Such
a request implies potential restrictions on the manner in which research results
are handled and disseminated, and may also restrict the personnel who have
access to this material. The difficulty with this approach is that the term
‘sensitive’ has not been defined, and the obligations of the Institute and the
individuals involved have not been clarified nor bounded. This situation opens
the Institute and its faculty, students, and staff to potential arbitrary dictates
from individual government contract monitors-however well intended. To
date, MIT has refused, in all cases, to accept this restriction in any of its
government contracts.
Sheila Widnall, Testimony Before the House Committee on Science, House Committee on
Science Hearings, at www.house.gov/science/hearings/full02/oct10/widnall.htm (Oct. 10,
2002).
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This question of scientific openness and national security is not
new. After the Corson Report85 during the Reagan Administration,
a simple principle was articulated—that research will either be
classified, in which case it is going to be done very, very tightly; or
it is going to be open, unclassified. The thought was we needed a
bright line, because having an in-between line of “sensitive but
unclassified” would make it very hard for scientists to do their
work.
The University of Illinois-Chicago recently held a conference
that included a panel featuring Abigail Salyers, past president of
the American Society of Microbiology (ASM), and she confirmed
that there has been an incredible amount of pressure from the
government, as to what should or should not be able to publish in
an open peer-reviewed scientific journal.86 The pressure has also
been internal, because these scientists think very much about the
public interest and about the scientific ethics of what they do.87
There is definitely a great deal of concern about there being too
much interference with the scientific process.88
[Slide] I bring up these examples because I think that they tie
in with the general questions of what is science and what kinds of
harms are we really going to focus on in the First Amendment
area.
The normal speech rules would tend to say that you cannot
restrict this kind of speech. The Pentagon Papers standard for
prior restraints,89 the Brandenburg advocacy test,90 Florida Star,91

85

NAT’L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES ET AL., SCIENTIFIC COMMUNICATION AND NATIONAL
SECURITY (1982), available at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309033322/html/.
86
See Diana Jean Schemo, Scientists Discuss Balance of Research and Security, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 10, 2003, at A12.
87
See id.
88
See id.
89
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 730 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(arguing that the newspaper could not be enjoined from publishing highly sensitive and
possibly unlawfully obtained government documents unless disclosure “will surely result
in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people”).
90
Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 444–47 (1969) (finding advocacy of unlawful
conduct is protected speech unless “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and . . . likely to incite or produce such action”).
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and other related cases92 say that information once in the public
domain cannot be restricted.
[Slide] But today we have a very different kind of ethos, at
least in some circles, which is that the science is going to be
misused.93 I think it is important to see here that one reason why
we have this concern about speech and harm is the presence of the
Internet.
[Slide] Now, the problem that the Internet poses for all of this
is that you no longer have the sort of presumption of limited
dissemination that we had in the old days.
[Slide] We see this problem in the privacy area as well. We
were happy to allow all sorts of information to be treated as public
records because it was locked up in a dusty file cabinet
somewhere.94 Now that public records are being put online, we are
starting to reevaluate. whether we should we do that. Did we
really mean to say that this—maybe a Social Security number,
some other information—ought to be public? The Internet is
causing us to redefine what a public record is.
What I want to suggest is that we are seeing in the area of First
Amendment law the Internet having the potential to redefine what
91

Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989) (finding First Amendment prevents
sanction for publishing truthful, lawfully acquired information of public significance,
absent a state interest of the highest order).
92
See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 528 (2001) (finding “if a newspaper
lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance then state
officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need . . .
of the highest order”).
93
See Ronald M. Atlas, Bioterrorism: The ASM Response, ASM News, at
http://www.asmusa.org/pasrc/feature1.htm (last modified June 10, 2002) (“[B]ioethicist
Arthur Caplan from the University of Pennsylvania is widely quoted as saying, ‘We have
to get away from the ethos that knowledge is good, knowledge should be publicly
available, that information will liberate us. . . . Information will kill us in the technoterrorist age, and I think it’s nuts to put that stuff on Web sites.’”). See also United States
v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (holding that publication of how
to build a hydrogen bomb could be used against the United States by its enemies in a
nuclear war and, therefore, restraint on publication is valid).
94
See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489
U.S. 749, 764 (1989) (“[P]lainly there is a vast difference between the public records that
might be found after a diligent search of courthouse files, county archives, and local
police stations throughout the country and a computerized summary located in a single
clearinghouse of information.”).
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is permissible within the Brandenburg95 framework.
Brandenburg’s relevance here, as a doctrinal matter, lies in its
setting a minimum standard for punishing speech based on its
“tendency” to cause harmful action by a reader or listener.96
[Slide] Now, as for advocacy and abstract teaching, if you are
familiar with the old cases—Noto97 and Yates,98 involving the
Smith Act and Communist membership—these are concepts that
the Supreme Court came up with to try to distinguish between
what was permissible and what was not. It was ultimately all
subsumed into Brandenburg.99
William Wiecek wrote a very nice article in the Supreme Court
Review about a year ago talking about the legal foundations of
American anti-Communism.100 Wiecek argues that part of what
made the anti-Communist hysteria so powerful was that the
U.S.S.R. and its creation of the Comintern101 put into place
something that policymakers in the United States and in other
countries could look at as a covert network, an apparatus devoted
to the spreading of bad information.102

95

395 U.S. at 444.
See Marc Rohr, Grand Illusion?, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 19 (2002) (“[B]y
logical implication [Brandenburg] creates a threshold that must be satisfied in every
instance in which governmentally controlled sanctions are sought to be placed upon the
exercise of speech perceived as likely to inspire illegal or dangerous behavior on the part
of a listener, regardless of the intent of the speaker.”).
97
Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297–98 (1961) (“[T]he mere abstract
teaching . . . of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and
violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such
action”).
98
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 324–25 (1957) (distinguishing advocacy of
action from advocacy of belief).
99
395 U.S. at 444.
100
William M. Wiecek, The Legal Foundations of Domestic Anticommunism: The
Background of Dennis v. United States, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 375.
101
The U.S.S.R. organized the Comintern (Communist International) in 1919 to spread
communism all over the world. See id. at 388.
102
As Justice Frankfurter wrote in a December 1942 letter to Justice Murphy, “the
Soviet Government fashioned the Comintern—the Third International—as the instrument
of the political export business of the Soviet and the Communist Party. In each country
there was a branch office of this international export business of the Soviet Government.
And those who were running the branch business in the various countries were, in fact,
political instruments of the Soviet regime.” Id. at 430.
96
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[Slide] This quote from Dennis I think exemplifies the point:
“[t]he existence of the conspiracy . . . creates the danger. . . . If the
ingredients of the reaction are present, we cannot bind the
government to wait until the catalyst is added.”103
Now, what I want to suggest is that in our time you don’t need
the U.S.S.R. and the Comintern. The Internet itself ends up being
sort of the unstated substitute—or the stated substitute—for a
conspiracy or a network, because information flows everywhere, to
everyone.
[Slide] So we have a number of shifts in the assessment of
harm. People are beginning to argue in the law review literature
that technical information does not really have very much
expressive value.104 I think we see a downgrading of science.
[Slide] There have been a number of articles criticizing the
Brandenburg decision in recent years, and they end up saying
things like, we should consider the gravity of the harm, etc., etc.105
I understand where these proposals are coming from, but they
promote ad hoc balancing and do not provide the kind of
protection for speech that the Brandenburg test does.
[Slide] One of the problems of these tests is that they focus
strictly on a quantitative or sort of an actual risk of harm. In the
Brandenburg situation, you are not necessarily talking about a
speaker who intends a bad result. So when you eliminate or dilute
103

Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). See also United States v. Dennis, 183
F.2d 201, 213 (2d Cir. 1950) (“Any border fray, any diplomatic incident, any difference
in construction of the modus vivendi—such as the Berlin blockade we have just
mentioned—might prove a spark in the tinder-box, and lead to war. We do not
understand how one could ask for a more probable danger, unless we must wait till the
actual eve of hostilities.”).
104
See Valeria M. Fogleman & James Etienne Victor, The Critical Technologies
Approach: Controlling Scientific Communication for the National Security, 4 BYU J.
PUB. L. 293, 373 (1990); S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy & Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr.,
Recalibrating the Cost of Harm Advocacy: Getting Beyond Brandenburg, 41 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1159 (2000).
105
See, e.g., David Crump, Camouflaged Incitement: Freedom of Speech,
Communicative Torts, and the Borderland of the Brandenburg Test, 29 GA. L. REV. 1, 14
(1994); Cass Sunstein, Is Violent Speech a Right?, 6 AM. PROSPECT 22, 34 (1995)
(“Brandenburg made a great deal of sense for the somewhat vague speech in question . . .
where relatively few people were in earshot” but “when messages advocating murderous
violence flow to large numbers of people, the calculus changes.”).
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an intent requirement, then you are essentially attributing the
foreseeable consequences of what others may do with speech to the
speaker.
[Slide] I think we also have associated with the rise of the
Internet a changing notion of the public. Traditionally, in First
Amendment law, the public has been viewed as a whole.
One of the things we see in the censorware area is, at the very
least, an audience segregation between the minors and everyone
else. But the terrorism situation, I think, is turning it into
something even more dangerous. The public is now seen as an
aggregate or a composite of many different parts, multiple
audiences, and we are beginning to see our job, or people are
beginning to see the job, as how do we keep those audiences
segregated—how do we speak to one set but not the other. In a
scientific context, that turns into a “need to know” mentality.
[Slide] And you actually see that in the DMCA. There are
exceptions, for instance, for encryption research106 and for reverseengineering.107 But within those exceptions there are also
restrictions on who you can give the information to.108 The idea is
not that, if you can do the research, then you can publish the
information openly. There is instead the idea that it should only be
disseminated to, say, bona fide encryption researchers, although
the Act does not specify how you know who those are.109
[Slide] So here is the general recap. What I worry about is
that under the pressure of these many different areas, and I’m not
106

See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(g) (2000).
See id. § 1201(f).
108
See id. § 1201(f)(3) (limiting the scope of dissemination for information gained
through exempted acts); id. § 1201(g)(3)(A) (noting that the applicability of encryption
research exemption depends on “whether the information derived from the encryption
research was disseminated, and if so, whether it was disseminated in a manner reasonably
calculated to advance the state of knowledge or development of encryption technology,
versus whether it was disseminated in a manner that facilitates infringement under this
title or a violation of applicable law other than this section, including a violation of
privacy or breach of security”).
109
See id. § 1201(g)(3)(B) (stating that the applicability of encryption research
exemption depends on “whether the person is engaged in a legitimate course of study, is
employed, or is appropriately trained or experienced, in the field of encryption
technology”).
107
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saying that they are all coming from the same place—whether it is
from intellectual property, whether it is from concern about sexual
imagery, whether it is concern about national security or economic
harm—the sort of pressure is to take Brandenburg back to
something that looks a lot like the Dennis test.110
[Slide] I will stop with a quote from Justice Jackson in
Korematsu,111 which sums up my feeling about where we seem to
be heading in free speech law: “The principle then lies about like a
loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring
forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.”112
We understand why a lot of these different interest groups want
to restrict scientific publication, why they want to impose liability
on speakers for what their hearers may do. But, even though they
do not intend it, there is a real danger of that kind of principle
becoming ensconced in First Amendment jurisprudence.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: Thank you, Lee, for a
fascinating broadening of the problem. Essentially you are talking
about dual-use data and dual-use audiences and the kinds of First
Amendment problems those now pose for us.
I think we will move right to Chuck Sims, who we heard on the
last panel, so I will abbreviate the introduction. I will just point
out that in this field he has litigated challenges to content-based
restrictions on cable television programming in the Supreme Court
case Denver Area Educational Television Consortium v. Federal

110

Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951) (“In each case courts must ask
whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of
free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.”).
111
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
112
Id. at 247 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“A military commander may overstep the bounds
of constitutionality, and it is an incident. But if we review and approve, that passing
incident becomes the doctrine of the Constitution.”).
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Communications Commission,113 and he was also involved in the
First Amendment challenge114 to New York’s Son of Sam law.115
MR. SIMS: And I was co-counsel with Ann, although not cotrial counsel, in the library filtering case.116 Jake Lewis seems like
a very nice guy, and I am sure I would feel better about his
censorship decisions, even his library discretionary decisions, than
John Ashcroft’s. But I think that he tells a tale which is essentially
Hamlet117 without the ghost, which wouldn’t be a very interesting
play. The version of the CIPA you got, the version of why the
Court ought to come out one way or why the case ought to come
out one way, is missing so much that you can’t really understand
what is going on. And, more importantly, it bears really no
relationship to what is really going on in terms of what Congress is
attempting to do and what is happening out there.
So let me begin not with the doctrine, because the doctrinal
move by the government in these cases is to take the money, take
the federal funding, and try to use that as an opportunity, as an
occasion to accomplish what everybody, I think, agrees cannot be
accomplished directly. That is, the Supreme Court would quickly
strike down an effort to tell every library in the country that they
had to employ one of these four companies to install filters to
accomplish all this on the Internet.
The argument is made, and it is made here and it is made in
other contexts—and Lee actually raised an interesting point that I
want to come to also—the argument is made that even though the
government could not do this directly to every library, as long as
there is a funding stream it can attach these conditions to the
funding stream.
113

518 U.S. 727 (1996) (holding that a Federal Communications Commission order
implementing the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act contained
two provisions that violated the First Amendment, and upholding a third provision).
114
See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 123 (1991) (holding that the law violates the First Amendment and is not
narrowly tailored to achieve the government’s goals).
115
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1) (McKinney 1982).
116
Am. Library Ass’n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002), prob.
juris. noted, 123 S. Ct. 551 (2002).
117
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET (Harold Jenkins ed., 1982) (Second Quarto ed.
1604).
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That is fundamentally worrisome. And in areas like this, where
huge percentages of libraries, for example, get and need federal
funding and become used to federal funding, unless the Supreme
Court backs away from that kind of argument, we will in fact have
what would be impermissible direct regulation, and it will be
indistinguishable in effect.
Let me start with just a few of what I think are indisputable
facts and then get to some of the doctrinal points.
I think it is undisputed that as a result of the CIPA we will have
blocking—that is, speech on the Internet by Ann’s and my clients
and others which would be directed out to the public and which
some members of the public would want to see, will not in fact get
to some members of the public that will want to see it. That is to
say, there will in fact be women in public libraries who will want
to learn certain things about breast cancer, 118 or who will want to
learn about a Republican candidate’s position on Internet
censorship.119
One of the great plaintiffs in this case is a Republic candidate
who, two or four years ago, was campaigning, among other things,
on the basis that Congress needs to clean up the Internet, and then
he found out that his own campaign web site was blocked.120
Planned Parenthood’s sites are blocked in various places.121
All sorts of breast cancer awareness things.122
So the first fact is that there will be blocking of speech from
willing speakers to willing listeners as a result of this law.
Second, the impact would happen notwithstanding the fact that
nobody at that local public library wants that to happen. So that
this image of the defense, which is essentially the virtues of
118

See Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 406 (noting that one library patron used
library Internet access to research breast cancer and reconstructive surgery).
119
See id. at 416 (discussing Jeffrey Pollock, a Republican candidate from Oregon, who
sought election in 2000 and 2002).
120
See id.
121
See id. (discussing Planned Parenthood and the sorts of information that it provides
over the Internet).
122
See id. at 427 (discussing one library patron’s embarrassment if he had to request
that breast cancer web sites be “unlocked” so that he might research treatment and
surgery options for his mother when she was diagnosed with the disease).
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nineteenth century small-town librarian’s connoisseurship and
collectorship is a picture which doesn’t bear much relationship to
the reality. The reality is not that Mary Smith librarian is deciding
this would be bad for Johnny and Susie. The reality is that one of
these four filtering companies has a program that results in
information about a Republican Congressman not being available
and information about Planet Out not being available.
The prime mover, the initial cause here, is not the local
librarian exercising the kind of judgment she makes about which
books to buy. The prime mover is the Congress of the United
States, which wants to clean up the Internet.
The third indisputable fact, I think, is that this censorship—and
I call it censorship because it blocks willing speakers from
reaching willing listeners—happens without any judicial review,
without any public participation whatsoever.
There is a whole very interesting line of cases developed in the
late 1950s through the 1960s which are sometimes referred to as
the First Amendment due process cases.123 They are the cases
where, after the Court had figured out doctrinally that it would
consider obscenity outside of the First Amendment, it was left with
the problem that obscene speech may not be speech.124 But
mistakes get made and judgments have to be made. How will we
reliably and safely, consistent with liberty, make sure that the right
decisions get made?
The judgment was that policemen—even judges—cannot
simply announce “this is unprotected.” They have to take it step
by step. There need to be careful procedures which do not result in
censorship, with hearings and opportunities to be heard, until the
judicial decision gets made. So that, although government is
allowed to get obscene speech off the streets, off the bookshelves,
out of the bookstores, we will not have overly censored or
123

See generally Henry P. Monaghan, First Amendment “Due Process”, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 518, 551 (1970) (remarking that First Amendment due process cases demonstrate
that First Amendment rights are fragile and processes affecting those rights must be
carefully scrutinized).
124
See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 490 (1957) (defining obscenity as
whether, to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the
material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interests).
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overbroad blocking before decisions are made in the way that they
ought to be made—that is, by judges.
The way this statute works comprehensively is to trash all of
that body of law, so that the result is the federal government
conditions the acceptance of these funding streams on the
installation of filters.125 If a public library system has ten
computers funded in part by the federal government, and others it
purchased outright, all of their computers are covered.126 The
argument is made by the government—rejected so far, and I think
it will be by the Court—that because you have accepted any
portion of this money, you have to follow our rules, even though
you otherwise would not have with respect to all of your
computers.
It seems to me that the analytical underpinnings of this
argument would permit right now the kind of censorship at MIT
that Lee was talking about. That is, the government could make
the argument—could enact a statute under this view—that any
institution which receives any federal funding shall have all
writings by professors reviewed by government security experts
and only published if they approve.
The argument that funding is an excuse for control, and control
well beyond the extent of the funding, is fundamentally
inconsistent, it seems to me, with the system of freedom of
expression that we have.
The fact is that in the Court’s decisions in the collection
cases—the principal case was the case involving a kid named
Steven Pico, who was represented by the ACLU when I was
there—the Court had to leave, and properly I suggest did leave,
discretion in the hands of school libraries about what books to buy,
because there was no other choice.127 Given limited budgets, the
fact is librarians inevitably have to pick and choose what to buy,
125

See 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6) (2000).
See id.
127
See Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,
869–71 (1982) (holding that, while the school board may have some discretion to remove
books, such removal may be called into question if motivated by the desire to suppress
certain ideas). “Our Constitution does not permit the official suppression of ideas.” Id. at
871.
126
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and in those decisions the Court saw that strict scrutiny was an
impossible standard to apply.
But where the Internet is simply connecting a computer and
you have the whole world available to you, if decisions are going
to get made about keeping certain things off, they ought not to be
made by the federal government for the whole country, and they
certainly ought not to be—effectively, by the design of the
statute—delegated to private companies that have criteria for
control that they are not obligated to talk about.
Astonishingly, in the course of litigating this case, a federal
court in California, I think it was, which got the discovery dispute
involving this third-party censoring library-filtering company, held
that that filtering company had trade secrets and they were entitled
not to provide meaningful discovery to the plaintiff’s lawyers in
this case.128 That it seems to me is fundamentally wrong. It was a
terrible decision. It is inconsistent with what I understand the law
to be.
It does seem to me that at the end of the day, if there is going to
be censorship, and if the censorship is going to be the result of
decisions made by private companies, courts, one way or the other,
are going to allow people challenging these kinds of decisions to
get into what is happening out there and why what is happening is
happening.
I do think that the fundamental issue here really is the issue
about whether government funding, which is a larger and larger
share of everybody’s lives—and there are government streams of
moneys that go to universities, that go to schools, that go all over
the society—whether those will become an occasion for the kind of
direct regulation that is otherwise not permissible. I do not think
so.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: Thank you.

128

See Multnomah County Pub. Library v. United States, No. 01-CV-1560 (S.D. Cal.
filed Aug. 29, 2001).
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I think what I would like to do is start to see if any of the
panelists have reaction to things that were said. We will just go
down the line.
MR. LEWIS: I guess I should say a couple of things about the
points that Charles made.
The paradigm of the First Amendment is a willing speaker
being able to communicate with willing listeners. But this case
involves a library. If I write a book, I am a willing speaker, and
there may well be—I mean, strange as it may seem—there might
be somebody in a library who might want to take out that book, but
I do not have any right to have the librarian acquire that book.
You cannot take the library out of the equation and what the
library does. There is inevitably a selection process going on. Just
calling it censorship does not make it unconstitutional.
The problem with saying that all federal funding raises these
kind of conditions that are impermissible because they are indirect
regulation, is it prevents then the federal government from
imposing any kind of conditions on its funding if somebody can
come up with any kind of First Amendment impact of it. The
federal government, obviously—any government—has the
appropriate ability within constitutional constraints to make sure
that its money is spent the way it wants it to be spent.129 Otherwise
it is not going to spend the money.
There was a lot missing from my presentation, and partly that
was my editorial judgment, not unlike that of a librarian, about
which issues to focus on.
But one of the things that should not be lost sight of is the
congressional motivation. Detailed in the district court opinion is
the fact that libraries, even before CIPA, have been struggling with
this problem of unlimited Internet access and what kinds of
constraints to put on Internet access.130
129

See generally South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206–10 (1987) (discussing
Congress’s right to further policies through funding, but noting the limits to Congress’s
right).
130
See Am. Library Ass’n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 422–23 (E.D. Pa.
2002) (explaining the importance of Internet access and public libraries), prob. juris.
noted, 123 S. Ct. 551 (2002).
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There was the example of the Greenville, South Carolina,
library that had a serious problem of people misusing their web
surfing on sexually explicit sites, pulling all sorts of tricks, like
leaving the site up for the next person who sits down at the
terminal and it pops up with a scene that they were not really
themselves planning to surf on.131 There were some examples,
anecdotal to be sure, of children that had been exposed to sexually
explicitly materials—somebody calling some kid over and saying,
“Hey, kid, look at this.”132
The fact is that there is a problem. Even the district court here
found there is a huge amount of pornography on the web.133
Unless there is some kind of filtering or some kind of method of
restricting access a library is going to encounter the problems that
arise with library use of the Internet that librarians, even apart from
any federal funding, traditionally have had to deal with.
So Congress was concerned that its funds were up to that point
unrestricted. Congress was concerned about this problem of
pornography on the web and protecting children from the web. It
looked at its funding and thought it may actually be exacerbating
this problem. We want libraries to be connected to the Internet, we
want that whole host of information that they get there, but we
really want to try and make an effort so that the bad doesn’t come
swooping in with the good and that parents have to worry about
their children being exposed to online material that might be
harmful to them.
The district court talked about a lot of other methods that
libraries could employ.134 But the primary one was just the old
traditional notion of the librarian coming over and tapping you on
the shoulder, “What are you looking at? That doesn’t comport
with our Internet use policy. You will have to go off or we’ll have

131

See id. at 423 (discussing, generally, how some patrons may unwittingly be exposed
to sexual or pornographic images).
132
See id.
133
See id. at 419 (“There is a vast amount of sexually explicit material via the Internet
and the Web.”).
134
See id. at 426, 480–81 (outlining less intrusive means that libraries may employ to
monitor Internet use).
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to suspend your library privileges.”135 When we go back to the
technology and the difficulty of seeing how effective or how
refined filtering can bewell, the traditional method, the tap on
the shoulder, can oftentimes be much less refined. In a sense,
filtering software was a way of trying to regularize these kinds of
decisions.
The other thing isnot to get into the details of the
filteringbut the filtering software can be tweaked in various
ways. The statute itself allows for disabling—a web site can be
unblocked if it turns out that there is a site that somebody thinks is
not covered by the statute.136
It is by no means clear to me that even if one were to put
everything aside, that one would prefer a regime where librarians
have to march up and down the rows and tap people on the
shoulder when they are surfing a site that is not appropriate for
their Internet use policy, as opposed to persons for the most part
having a web surfing experience that is private from the librarian
and every once in awhile something pops up that may be
blocked—might only come once in a blue moon or never.
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: Ann?
MS. BEESON: Yes, just briefly.
First of all, just in terms of Jake’s latest comment about the
librarian versus the filter and which regime we prefer, I think he is
comparing apples to oranges a little bit.
Just to give a very concrete example, it seems highly unlikely
to me that any librarian anywhere in the country would go up to a
patron who is looking at a site about Buddhist nuns and tell them
that they should not be looking at it.
The point is that the filters do not just block access to sexually
explicit sites. They block access to a whole range of sites that do
not come anywhere close to the line. And just to be clear, when
we were talking about the 4,000 sites that we put into evidence,
135

See id.
See 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(D) (2000); Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 426
(“The librarians who testified at trial whose libraries use Internet filtering software all
provide methods by which their patrons may ask the library to unblock specific Web sites
or pages.”).
136
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those were those kind of sites we were talking about. They were
not breast cancer sites. They were not sites targeted to the lesbian
and gay community. They were sites that could not, under
anyone’s definition of pornography, even conceivably be
considered improper in a public library. And that is the kind of
stuff that we are, of course, primarily worried about that is going to
happen under a filtering regime.
I also want to say, because I don’t think it has been brought up
yet and this continues to be a problem with every single attempt by
Congress to try to restrict the availability of sexually explicit
material over the Internet, they continue to act as if their primary
concern is protecting minors. All of the discussion is around the
protection of minors.
All of the legislation has, unquestionably, on its face, burdened
the ability of adults to obtain access to speech that is clearly
protected for them.
And so I think we need to be very careful in talking about what
the harm is and what we all agree should be fixed. Even if we
could all agree that something should be done about unwitting
exposure of children to sexually explicit material, that is not what
these statutes are doing. What they are doing is throwing out the
baby with the bath water and preventing adults from also viewing
this material.
And also, on the question of other alternatives, there are other
ways for parents to exercise their discretion and their role as
parents in preventing their children from obtaining unwanted
material.
First of all, there was a lot of evidence at trial put in that
librarians are not by any means ignoring this problem.137 They are
very concerned about this notion that their community could
potentially be harmed in their library. They have gone to great
lengths to come up with ways to deal with it that do not infringe on
speech, which include Internet use policies, and exercising their

137

See Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 423–24 (discussing how librarians
monitor Internet use).
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traditional role to prevent disruptive behavior in the library, which
is a very different thing from speech.138
So when you are talking about this example that the
government loves to trot out about the guy who asks the little girl
to come over and look at a porn site—I mean, give me a break.
There are rules, and they have been there ever since the beginning
of librarianship in this country.
MR. LEWIS: You like the Buddhist nun example.
MS. BEESON: I know, I know. We all trot out our best
examples. It’s true.
A lot of these alternatives that librarians have come up with are
educational. They are training parents, training kids, on how to use
the Internet so they do not unwittingly come across harmful
material.
Here is where we talk about real library selection. When you
talk about library selection in the context of the Internet, librarians
are doing it in much more of the same way they did in the print
world, by choosing the best sites. Now you can sign on in the
kids’ section of the library and what you get are the 100 best sites
for kids that the librarians have reviewed and looked at. That is a
great way to start your kid off on the Internet. It does not exclude
people from going elsewhere, but it does keep the librarian’s role
in selecting the best sites for the kids.
And finally, just one last point in terms of these other
alternatives. In 1998, Congress commissioned a study by the
National Research Council to look into various ways to address the
problem of pornography on the Internet.139 The head of the
National Research Council’s report commission was a former
Attorney General, Dick Thornburgh. They wrote a 400-page book,
which I urge anyone interested in this issue to read, which
documents an incredible range of alternatives that we all have for
addressing this problem that do not involve mandatory penalties or
funding restrictions as restrictive of speech as this statute is.140
138

See id.
See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY
Thornburgh & Herbert S. Lin eds., 2002).
140
See id.
139

AND THE INTERNET
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MR. TIEN: Yes. There is a real difference, I think, between, as
Chuck put it, this ideal of the library and the librarians making
their decisions and Congress imposing a particular strategy across
all libraries.
At the EFF we think too much exposure in the libraries of kids
to pornography is a problem. But the answer is not to say, we’re
just going to block it. The answer is, as Ann was talking about,
education. There are many, many ways that it could be done.
In one of the papers that we did for this National Research
Council Report141 we pointed out that the problem with systematic
laws and with censorware—and I underscore the word
“systematic”—is that you don’t know what is going to be blocked.
One of the things that we have tried to show, and that I think
was shown in the CIPA case,142 was that these are not just random
accidents, that there are specific technical reasons why certain sorts
of things are blocked.143 When you block by text, you are going to
have systematic overblocking related to the presence of certain key
words. There is a virtual hosting problem, where because one
domain is under a lot of other domains and if they want to block
that domain, they would simply have to block all of the others that
go with it. There are systematic technical reasons why censorware
is always going to overblock.
Now, some people will say maybe the technology will get
better and better and better. Well, I think that is really highly
unlikely. On the one hand, there are technical problems with it of
the kind I just mentioned. And then, second, at the end of the day
what we are asking the software to do is to make judgments, legal
judgments, about what is harmful to minors or what is obscene. I
think it is going to be very, very difficult for any piece of software
to make judgments either about the value of a work, which is one
of the problems, and also to make an accurate judgment about
contemporary community standards, which is another element of
it. If you can’t make those judgments, you are not going to have
anything that is even close to constitutionally sensitive.
141
142
143

See id.
See Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 401.
See id. at 427–50.
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Maybe artificial intelligence will get there, but if it does, we
will be in such a different world that they wouldn’t need lawyers in
the first place.
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: Would it really be such a
different world? I mean, we look to individuals to make those
judgments, but we don’t trust those. We send it to the courts to
decide whether the individual is right. Why would it be any
different sending the technical artificial intelligence decisions to a
court to determine whether the program kicked out the right site or
the wrong site?
MR. TIEN: What I mean by the world being different is that
everything in the world would be different. I mean society itself
would be completely different if we had computers capable of
making human judgments of that sort. I think we should not fall
into the trap of believing that we can think about that kind of
advance in technology and hold the rest of society constant. So I
do not want to speculate as to what anything is going to be like
with that level of intelligence in a computer.
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: You are assuming the level of
human intelligence making the decision is at a high degree right
now. It sounds to me like you are suggesting that the computer has
to do it at least equivalently or rather better than the human. I am
not sure that is the right threshold.
MR. TIEN: I would say that it would have to do it as well as a
human.
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: It raises some interesting
questions. I think this came up from Chuck’s emphasizing the fact
that there are only four companies—I think he mentioned that at
least two or three times—that do the filtering and we don’t know
how they are doing the filtering. Well, wouldn’t the solution
simply be higher transparency requirements in how the filtering is
done? And if the obligation is there for the libraries receiving
federal funds to purchase filtering programs, then presumably a
marketplace would emerge with a substantially greater number of
companies out there offering products for sale to libraries.
What would be your response to that?
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MR. SIMS: Well, part of the answer is what Ann indicated,
that it is not a happenstance that these products don’t work. There
are fundamental reasons why they cannot work, at least for the
foreseeable future. I am not sure what the Supreme Court would
do if there was anything like that that could with 100 percent
reliability distinguish what we all think of as commercial porn
from everything else.
I would think that the Supreme Court is going to be
fundamentally affected by the fact that the facts are nowhere near
that. The rule has been that where First Amendment interests are
at stake, precision of regulation is the touchstone.
Jake wants to talk about percentages and talk about how things
are getting better and better. But, as I understand the First
Amendment, if one web site of Planned Parenthood, of a
Republican Congressman or of David Hume or anybody else,
which is protected speech and not harmful, is going to get blocked,
that is going to be the end of the case.
MR. LEWIS: No, not this case, because in a facial challenge
the one doesn’t get you there. Now, as applied challenge—and I
think that was Joel’s point, that you always have a second round on
this stuff.
If there was a specific person who asks a librarian to unblock a
site, and the librarian says “no way,” well, then you’ve got another
lawsuit for those particular facts.
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: Why do we assume that is the
standard—that if there is a single web site out there that gets
blocked, that is the standard we should be looking at? Sort of ballparking some of these numbers—
MR. SIMS: Because the First Amendment says Congress shall
pass no law restricting the freedom of speech,144 and if there are
willing speakers and there are willing listeners and the government
is intervening and blocking them from getting together, that
violates the First Amendment.145
144

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000);
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Sable Comm. of Cal., Inc. v. Fed. Communications
Comm’n, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
145
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PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: Well, in this case the
government is simply saying, you can’t spend taxpayers’ money
for people to look at pornography in a public library.
MR. SIMS: But then the government could just as well say any
university that gets any federal funding in its physics department
must submit everything written by the physics faculty to
government review. The Court will not uphold such a statute. The
fact of government funding will not, in the end, I think, be deemed
to be sufficient to support regulation that would be impermissible
if done directly.
MS. BEESON: Let me just jump in and say something in
response to your question about transparency. That is, we do
believe that, obviously, having a transparent list would help, of
course, because it would mean that at least you could review and
improve the products. Contrary to what the companies may
believe, we are actually not trying to put them out of business.
In fact, a little irony here—I’m sure Jake thinks it’s ironic, at
least—we put forth the availability of filters as a voluntary option
for parents to use in arguing that filters are one possible lessrestrictive alternative to criminal penalties for restriction of free
speech, like are at issue in the first two attempts by Congress to
address this problem.146
So we are not trying to say that there should not be filters out
there. We are trying to say that they should not be mandated by
the federal government and that they should be as good as they can
possibly be, and therefore the list should be transparent.
Transparency would not solve all the problems, because of
course it would only help after the fact. It would only mean that
once someone happened to discover that a site on the list was
improperly categorized, they might get it fixed, and therefore
further blocking might not happen. But up until that time, it is
almost certain that the original user would get blocked. That is a

146

See 47 U.S.C. §§ 223, 231 (2000). Two provisions of the CDA relating to the
protection of minors from harmful material on the Internet were declared facially
overbroad and in violation of the First Amendment. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844
(1997).
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prior restraint on speech and we think it violates the First
Amendment.
MR. LEWIS: I guess now that the words “prior restraint” have
been spoken—
MS. BEESON: I know. I was waiting.
MR. LEWIS: This is a library. By that logic, it really is—I
mean, there are a lot of problems that come out, and interesting
questions, outside the library context, but this case happens to be a
library case.
The thing that I have had trouble understanding is a prior
restraint argument in the library, where you have to go up to the
librarian and ask to borrow a book, for the most part. You can take
it off the shelf, if the book happens to be on the shelf. In a closed
stack library, like the New York Library’s main branch, for every
book, ninety-nine percent of the books, you have to go and ask
permission to borrow the book. If there is a prior restraint in all of
this, then there is a prior restraint in practically everything that a
librarian does.
The transparency point is kind of interesting because the
selection process—and I have tried to get myself up to speed on
exactly what book selection principles are and collection
development philosophy and things like that—that process is
entirely nontransparent. I would say that the principles are stated
at such a level of generality that they do not provide you with any
real information about how a particular selection decision is going
to be made.
But, interestingly enough, as I understand the software, while
you do not have a list of the sites ex ante, you can plug a website in
and immediately get an answer about whether that site would be
blocked or not.147 So there is at least transparency to that extent.
I guess there are two points I would make. First, in this First
Amendment area, going back to the title of the discussion, there is
a position that the First Amendment permits no regulation of
147

See Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 430 (referring to the ability to enter URLs
into “the ‘URL checker’ that most filtering software companies provide on their Web
sites”).
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speech at all. While I suppose that is a possible reading of the First
Amendment, it has never been one that the Court has adopted. If it
was adopted to the extent that I think many would argue on the
other side of these cases, it would simply paralyze government
action to address this kind of problem, because it would just act as
sort of a trump card, where you raise it and all discussion stops.
But there are many cases in which the government is able to
regulate speech if it has a sufficiently compelling interest, even
when strict scrutiny is involved and the regulation is narrowly
tailored.148 Here I don’t think strict scrutiny is applicable, because
if strict scrutiny is applicable to this kind of action, then it is
applicable even to Ann’s example of the best web sites. Somebody
could say, “Well, what are you putting that up for? Those aren’t
my best web sites. Where did you come up with those best web
sites? You mean because of the content of the speech?”
The other thing I would say on these discussions, because it is
interesting, is there also seems to be a view that the Internet is
another world, that we are not of this world when we go into the
Internet. I think this library case is an example—it is not the only
example, but one example—of a situation in which it really sort of
depends on how you view what happens when you connect to the
Internet. Do you somehow, like in a “Star Trek” episode, go into
hyperspace somewhere and come out in another dimension? Or is
the Internet connection really simply an aspect of this world that
we live in? If it is, then maybe many of the same rules that would
govern the offline world should govern the online world.
MR. TIEN: Can I say something real quick? This last point is
one of the points that I was trying to make in my presentation. I
have been listening to you talk about continually sort of
mapping—you say, “It’s a library, it’s a library, it’s just the same
thing.” And yet, in many other areas, such as when people say the
Internet is a vehicle for piracy, the world has changed, we’ve got to
do something different, so there is real instability.
148

See, e.g., Sable Communications of Calif., Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm’n,
492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (“The Government may . . . regulate the content of
constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses
the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest.”).

6 - PANEL III FORMAT

5/12/03 8:39 AM

876

[Vol. 13:831

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

And when you look at it from the larger perspective, there is a
complete incoherency in the way the Internet gets played.
Basically it gets spun in whatever direction people want to spin it.
If the government wants to spin it as something that they want to
regulate, they say this is just like real space and we should use the
same rules. But if, on the other hand, they say the Internet is a big
threat, then they will spin it as something unprecedented, we never
had this sort of problem before because of the Internet. That just
doesn’t make sense to me.
MS. BEESON: If I could make just one quick comment—
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: And then we will go to
questions from the floor.
MS. BEESON: I really think that there is a fundamental
misunderstanding here between the notion of selection and
prohibition. I mean, just to be really clear, when a librarian
decides to house a particular book on the shelf in the physical
collection, there is nothing in that decision that prevents the patron
from obtaining a book that does not happen to be on the shelf. In
fact—and the record shows this quite clearly—the very purpose of
librarianship is to go out of their way through any means possible
to get the patron exactly what they want, and they do this even if
the book isn’t on the shelf. They put in requests for inter-library
loans. There are a number of different ways the librarian will try
to get the information to the patron, even if it is not sitting on the
shelf.149
Similarly, of course, when a library decides to come up with a
list of selected web sites, they aren’t preventing patrons from
accessing sites that are not on their list. They are just providing a
kind of value-added service of saying, we think these are the best
sites in case you want to start here first, but we will help you get
other ones if they are not here.
So I really think that there is a misunderstanding here in what
Jake is saying about the listing and it being analogous to filtering.
MR. LEWIS: But if I try to borrow or get a subscription to
Hustler magazine, the facts show that I’ve got eight out of 48,000
149

See Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 420–21.
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libraries that I can possibly go to. There is a limit to what the
librarians are going to do, and there has always been a limit to the
boundaries under which they find the right book for the right
person.
PROFESSOR REIDEENBERG: You are also shifting the point
of inquiry, because if what the blocking program at the library does
is it says you can’t visit this site but the librarian can unblock the
site on request, that is much like the book wasn’t there on the shelf
and I go to inter-library loan to get a copy.
MS. BEESON: The problem, of course, is in the inter-library
loan context there is nothing which has made a judgment that this
is bad speech—I mean, nothing whatsoever, because there are no
value judgments on what is sitting on the library shelf. Whereas
under this system—
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: There is the value judgment of
whether the librarian chose to stock it.
MS. BEESON: What the CIPA literally says is, you are
blocked because this site has been categorized as pornography.150
I mean, how many patrons do you think are going to go up to their
librarian and say, I want to have access to the Buddhist nun site
because it has been blocked? Maybe that one person would.
MR. LEWIS: Just to make it clear, the CIPA doesn’t say
anything about how the message gets put. It just says if there is a
technological protection measure—and actually that, in terms of
tweaking the software, if your problem is only with what pops up,
to just say, “This web site has been preliminarily categorized as
subject to the CIPA. Please see your librarian.”
MS. BEESON: As being illegal for you to look at in this
library.
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: Does CIPA even require that
you identify the blocked site as being categorized that way?
MR. LEWIS: No, no. It could say “access blocked.”
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: “Please see the librarian.”
MR. LEWIS: Yes, “please see the librarian.”
150

47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6).
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MR. SIMS: But under the law as it works now, people do not
know what they have not seen.
MR. LEWIS: That’s not true. I think it tells—as I understand
it, you search for a site, when you know what site, and you click on
a site.
MR. SIMS: If you are searching for breast cancer, for example,
there may be twenty sites that you do not see. There is nothing in
the law that requires the filtering company to deliver to you the
information that you have been precluded by the private parties
from seeing something you have asked for.
MR. LEWIS: You have gotten finally to the point at which in
the record—my command is not infallible, but I do know from the
record that even if you aren’t informed up-front, the librarian has
that information.151
MR. SIMS: Jake, let me ask you a question. Do you think that
the Court will necessarily want to consider or feel obligated to
consider this statute, which is really the federal government
stepping into maybe 80 or 90 percent of the nation’s libraries, as if
it were exactly the same case as if Ann were challenging a library
in Mobile, Alabama, which had done the same thing?
MR. LEWIS: Yes. I don’t know whether they are going to
want to, but that is one of the arguments we are making.
MR. SIMS: I understand. I think it is a very interesting
federalism kind of issue. When a fundamentalist parent in
Nebraska wants to take a ten-year-old to New York City, they
can’t have a clean New York City. They can only come to New
York City by being willing to subject themselves to newsstands
that have breasts hanging out all over the place.
MR. LEWIS: But the interesting part about the district court
decision here—and this is actually one of the interesting things
about how the litigation went—there was an argument, and there
still is an argument, that the librarians should just be free to make
whatever decisions they want, free of governmental interference or
a thumb on the scale from funding.

151

See Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 426–27, 430.
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But the way the district court resolved the issue, they
essentially took that judgment out of even the librarian’s hand by
saying that this content-based kind of selection, at least insofar as
the Internet is concerned, is a violation of First Amendment.152 It
prevents the librarian back in the Midwest from making that kind
of determination either. It is not a question of just cleaning up
New York. Nobody can clean up everything, wherever you are.
MS. BEESON: That is a complete overstatement. First of all,
we are only challenging—
MR. LEWIS: Simplification.
MS. BEESON: Yes, simplification.
We are only challenging the filters as they apply in public
libraries, first of all, so this whole other issue about schools we
haven’t even gotten into.
MR. LEWIS: I didn’t mean to open that up.
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: The CIPA also requires that
any school receiving funding under EAA or qualifying for discount
pricing for Internet access must have filtering in the school
computer systems that are connected to the Internet.153 You have
tactfully avoided touching that part.
MR. LEWIS: Ann is absolutely right. She did not challenge
that part.
MS. BEESON: In this case.
MR. LEWIS: This case does not involve the schools.
MS. BEESON: This case does not involve that.
MR. LEWIS: The other shoe.
MS. BEESON: The point is the one that I made before, which
is that a number of libraries who are our clients in the case already
do have filters in the libraries for parents who want to use them. It
is just a voluntary option. The filter is there. Sometimes it is even
a default. The filter is there in the kids’ section of the library.
They are addressing the problem.
152
153

See id. at 495.
47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(5).
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MR. LEWIS: But the library cannot go further and make it
mandatory.
MS. BEESON: For adults, that’s right, they cannot.
MR. LEWIS: That is actually one of the interesting aspects of
the case. The district court, not just the CIPA, has cut back on the
librarians’ ability to make their own independent judgments.
MR. SIMS: But Ann would have done that eventually anyway.
MR. LEWIS: She would have tried, that’s for sure.
MR. TIEN: But is that really—I mean, I am obviously not as
familiar with the case as you are, but when you look at the
rationale that is used by the courts for holding the law
unconstitutional, many of those reasons simply do not apply to the
case of a librarian making a judgment in the library about content
decisions.
MR. LEWIS: That is the interesting thing. The Court did
downplay this approval plan option.154 But as far as I can see,
approval plans, which are the kind of thing where you go to the
publisher and say, give us your monthly list and we will send back
the stuff, that is precisely what a filter does, except that the
librarian acts as the filter for the purposes of the wholesaler. It
does seem to me that there is a better match.
But I agree with you that this case, in part, turns upon how the
courts are going to look at that mapping of what I would call the
“real world” and the Internet.
I am not sure there is an incoherence, to respond to Lee on his
point. It is true that people point out that the Internet poses more
serious problems in certain circumstances than the real world, but
the framework for analyzing those problems, I think, is often
overstated, that somehow a different framework needs to apply.
To my mind, the regular framework, the framework we would
apply to this same type of problem of a lesser magnitude, would
also apply to addressing that problem in the Internet context.
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: Let’s see if we can take
audience questions now.
154

See Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 421.
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Does anyone in the audience have a question to pose to the
panel?
MS. BEESON: Thank you for staying this late on a Friday
afternoon.
QUESTIONER (Wendy Seltzer): Thanks. My question is for
Chuck, who I think is a terrific advocate and I am very pleased to
have him on our side of this case.
MR. TIEN: You always want Chuck on your side.
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: Wendy Seltzer from the
Berkman Center speaking.
QUESTIONER: But I am puzzled by what seems to be a
disconnect between the position here and the position in the DVD
case,155 where we found ourselves on opposite sides. There you
have a technology that is preventing people from accessing and
making First Amendment-protected fair use of media. You talked
about First Amendment due process when the policeman is
declaring something obscene without judicial intervention. You
talked about delegation of control to the filtering companies.
To me it looks very similar to what the DMCA asks us to do to
technological protection measures, delegating the control to them
and relying on those to tell us what is or is not permitted use of
media.
MR. SIMS: I must say I don’t think there is any inconsistency
at all.
MS. BEESON: You are just afraid to answer the question with
me sitting up here, Chuck. Come on.
MR. SIMS: No. Not speaking for any clients here, it was
perfectly clear to me that the Felten case was totally concocted, as
the district court found,156 and because there was never any
155

Mr. Sims was an attorney for the plaintiffs in Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (2000), which found defendants violated the anticircumvention provision of the DMCA by posting their DeCSS program on the web.
156
Felten v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., No. CV-01-2669 (D.N.J. dismissed Nov.
28, 2001). See EFF, Frequently Asked Questions About Felten & USENIX v. RIAA
Legal Case, at http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/Felten_v_RIAA/faq_felten.html (last
visited Apr. 9, 2003) (giving background information about Felten).
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genuine apprehension that he should have had, and nobody could
read the DMCA and think that the speech he was going to give in
Las Vegas, or wherever it was, was going to violate the DMCA.
He should have just gone ahead, as he eventually did, and give the
Goddamn speech.
In the same way, without asking Ann to violate a client
confidence, in her initial comments she sort of portrayed this
picture, as I recall it, of little Ben Edelman coming up to her and
saying, “Boy, I’m really afraid about the DMCA. Could you bring
a lawsuit so that I can do my research?”
In the real world, as I assume that it happened, and as I would
imagine it happened with Ben Edelman—whose parents, after all,
didn’t ask a federal court if they could demonstrate against the
civil rights laws, they just went ahead and did it—in the real world
he could have gone ahead and just done this work. It would have
been fabulous. It would have helped a lot of people. He should
not have worried about any of these legal problems, which are not
genuine legal problems, and he should have gone ahead and done
his research and nobody would have sued him.
So without having the DMCA in front of me, I cannot go
through the whole list of exemptions that I think would have
applied to his work, but I think that this lawsuit is feigned, is not
serious. Whether or not the Court will end up deciding it, I cannot
tell. But it is pretty clear to me that he could have just gone ahead
and done this research without worrying about it.
QUESTIONER (Wendy Seltzer): We still can’t take movie
clips off a DVD without violating the DMCA.157
MR. SIMS: There are no movies that I am aware of that people
can’t make extraordinarily extensive fair use of, regardless of
whether they are on DVDs or not. I mean, as I have said in various
contexts, when I was a kid, before there were videocassettes, we all
had fair use rights to deal with movies. There was a fair use right

157

See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000) (prohibiting the circumvention of technological
measures undertaken to protect a copyrighted work).
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with respect to Gone With the Wind.158 But your fair use had to
live in a world in which MGM only released this movie every five
years and they didn’t release copies of it so that people could put
them in their homes. It didn’t mean that there was a First
Amendment violation. It didn’t mean that the First Amendment
was violated.
People can make fair use of every movie out there, whether or
not it is on a DVD.159 Can they also get an undecrypted copy and
put it on their own computer? No. Why? Because Congress
decided that the harm that would come from that was greater than
the benefits.160 That is the kind of judgment Congress makes.
MS. BEESON: Just to be clear on the Edelman case about the
current posture on whether or not he is sufficiently threatened, and
to distinguish it a little bit from the Felten case, in the Felten case,
after the EFF filed the lawsuit on Felten’s behalf, the recording
industry pretty much rolled over with respect to the specific
research at issue. They wrote a letter promising not to sue for this
particular paper Felten wanted to present.161
In the Edelman case, we filed the complaint.162 We would love
to get a letter like that from N2H2 that says, “You know what?
We think your research is hunky-dory. Go ahead and go with it.
We won’t sue you.”
Instead, they do not do that at all. They file this public
document which says that they do believe that if he does—and also
in their motion to dismiss that they filed—they catalogued the
specific harms they will suffer if Edelman does this research.163
They say that their rights have been violated and that they will go
158

See SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (finding the fictional
work The Wind Done Gone protected under 17 U.S.C. § 107 as parody and, therefore, a
fair use of decedent’s work Gone with the Wind).
159
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (providing certain exceptions for the use of copyrighted material
that will not be considered infringement).
160
See DMCA, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1988) (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 512, 1201–1205, 1301–1322 and 28 U.S.C. § 4001).
161
See Jennifer 8. Lee, Delayed Report on Encryption Flaws to Be Presented, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 15, 2001, at C6.
162
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Edelman v. N2H2, Inc. (D. Mass.
filed July 25, 2002) (No. 02-CV-11503), http://archive.aclu.org/court/edelman.pdf.
163
N2H2, Inc., supra note 35.
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forward.164 This is a very different situation and it seems clear to
me that Felten does have standing to get relief in the court.
MR. TIEN: And if I could add a point about the Felten
situation, we did not get into that case until after the letter came.
MR. SIMS: But you stayed in the case and tried to get a
decision on the merits out of the judge well after you were told “no
problem.”
MR. TIEN: Yes. We were told that there was no problem as to
the particular paper. The problem was that there were other people
on the team who were doing other kinds of research.
But my point is that there was a real threat from the RIAA and
from the other private defendant at the outset which generated a
tremendous amount of controversy within the conference
organizers in Pittsburgh.165
MR. SIMS: It would take a lot to persuade me that Ben
Edelman was afraid to do this research without Ann bringing and
winning this lawsuit.
MS. BEESON: You just don’t know how careful he is with his
money. This was the guy who made three times as much money as
I did last year. He does not want to have to give up some of that
money to N2H2 because they get a judgment against him. He just
doesn’t. And he should not have to. That is the whole nature of
the First Amendment. Chuck, you know that. He should not have
to do that.
MR. SIMS: And the ACLU would have been there to defend
him every step of the way.
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: Other questions from the floor?
QUESTIONER: I would like to just say—and then ask a
question—that it is a sad commentary for me that we, in the name
of children, in the name of God, sometimes perpetrate some really
terrible things. We want to protect children, and in the efforts to

164

See id.
Letter from Matthew J. Oppenheim, Sr. Vice Pres., RIAA, to Prof. Edward Felten,
Dep’t of Computer Science (Apr. 9, 2001), http://www.eff.org/Legal/Cases/
Felten_v_RIAA/20010409_riaa_sdmi_letter.html.
165
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do so we throw out our civil liberties and our history of freedom of
speech.
I think in America we have a terrible sex problem, and maybe
the Congress people have knee-jerk reactions, so that when we get
legislation which tries to solve a problem of thought control, trying
to control the thoughts of our children, etc., and when we see it
doesn’t work, we don’t drop it, we just continue going on with it.
That is a very sad thing to me. It is like 1984166 all over again.
I don’t know how the government and those people who are
trying to push this kind of a system that filters everything—it is
just really a sad commentary of where we are. We are throwing
the baby out with the bath water by all means, but we are going
much further. I think we really hurt America, hurt Americans,
when we think that way.
MR. SIMS: Well, there is actually a little ground for optimism.
There has been a series of these cases since the late 1980s. Jake
told me today, which I hadn’t known, that he had litigated most of
them.
The fact is that the free speech side wins in the U.S. Supreme
Court virtually all of them, including one called Playboy v. United
States167 that I wouldn’t have given you very much money for the
day it was filed.
MS. BEESON: Yes. If anybody is trying to handicap this, I
don’t think I have ever not won a case that has gone to the
Supreme Court on this.
MR. SIMS: Whether Jake is deliberately throwing
MS. BEESON: It just goes to show you that we are right.
MR. LEWIS: Or the cases they make me take.
MR. SIMS: Whether Jake is throwing them or whether the
Supreme Court is doing the right thing, I don’t know.

166

GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1948).
529 U.S. 803 (2000) (holding that the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §
561 (2000), violated the First Amendment by restricting transmission of cable television
channels primarily dedicated to sexually oriented programming).
167
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QUESTIONER: Well, Mr. Sims, I will just say that I am very
heartened to hear that, and I understand that. But I am not looking
forward with great relish to the new composition of our Supreme
Court and where they will take us down the road.
MR. LEWIS: I would like to say one thing. I mean, the fact
is—you know, glass half-empty or glass half-full, or whatever.
To look at the other side of the coin, it is quite clear in this area
that Congress has remained very concerned about it. You are
absolutely right that there have been a number of lawsuits in the
Supreme Court that have struck down statutes that have
approached this problem from a number of different areas, and
Congress has not given up.168
I guess I would view that as being because these are
conscientious efforts and people have thought long and hard, and
the courts have made them think long and hard, that they still
consider there to be a serious problem that they do not want to give
up on.
The question obviously in these cases—and they do get
litigated, and Ann is perfectly happy, I’m sure, to litigate the next
six statutes—
MS. BEESON: That’s because we keep winning.
MR. LEWIS: But you shouldn’t discount the fact that there is a
significant amount of support in Congress, and presumably outside
of Congress—
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: In the public.
MR. LEWIS: —that something should be done. I think the
Supreme Court’s remand in the latest case, the COPA case,169
suggests that even the Court is not willing to sort of give up or
throw up its hands and say, “Nothing can be done,” although the

168

See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Denver Area Educ. Telecomms.
Consortium, Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm’n, 518 U.S. 727 (1996); Sable
Communications of Cal., Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm’n, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
169
See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002) (finding that the COPA’s reference to
contemporary community standards in defining what was harmful to minors did not alone
render the COPA unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment).
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First Amendment does impose a very high standard before the
Court can regulate speech.
It would be extraordinary to say that Congress cannot address a
problem like this, where many people in Congress are of the view
that there remains a serious problem.
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: I think it is not just Congress,
but it is in the country. The Congress is reflecting the view of the
country as a whole. This is one area where, unlike what we heard
earlier in the debate over intellectual property rights with
significant economic interests that were at stake, I don’t think you
see a well-funded anti-porn industry running to Congress for
protection.
These are more like grassroots-oriented organizations. They
are not organizations that have commercial economic interests at
stake for Congress to be regulating in this area. I mean, it is not
the Trade Association of Software Filter Manufacturers that is
running to Congress and saying, be sure you mandate that public
libraries buy my product. It is not that kind of regulation.
I think there is really a very strong current, and reflected in
your earlier remark about the composition of the Court. If this
current is that deep in the United States and if the Court is
consistently refusing to allow Congress to regulate in this area, we
should not be surprised to see changes in the composition of the
kind of judges that are going to be appointed to the Court.
We will take one more question up in the back and then we’ll
break.
QUESTIONER: My name is Matt Halloran and I’m a student
here at Fordham.
Assuming that this is something that we are dedicated to
stopping, which is a whole other argument—I find it laughable to
think that fuzzy things like parental education are going to stop
kids from looking at pornography on the Internet. I was
wondering, to that extent, how both sides would feel about calling
the government’s bluff on this being for kids and just using
children-dedicated computers with filters on them?
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MS. BEESON: Yes. It is an interesting question you raise,
because there are really two different interests, and I think the
government is not always so clear in distinguishing these two
things. I think they are different.
One is—and this is the one that I think absolutely can be solved
by education—one is to prevent children from accidentally
encountering harmful material on the Internet. That has been
shown already—we have the record to prove it—to be addressed in
some ways by much better ways, by searching strategies and all of
that. The filters do not help that problem at all, because no matter
how much the filters block, there is still a huge amount of sexually
explicit material available that they are just as likely in fact to
stumble across.
The second problem, of course, is the primarily slightly older
children that I think we would probably all agree are affirmatively
trying to find that material. I, frankly, think that is a very different
issue.
To the extent that you are talking about teen-agers, I think teenagers do have the right to locate and find material about sex. They
just do. They are becoming sexual beings themselves. I don’t
think, myself—and speaking for the ACLU, we really don’t
think—that there should be so much of a difference between the
rights of teen-agers and the rights of adults to obtain access to very
purposefully sexually explicit material.
So I just do not think there is much of an interest left after that.
MR. LEWIS: When I was a kid, there was no federal grant for
me to buy Playboy magazine, and to some extent—
MS. BEESON: Poor Jake.
MR. LEWIS: I guess if I had been born a little later, a little bit
down the road, there might be such a grant program.
But really, you can’t take the federal funding out of the
equation. The problem with filtering computers in the children’s
section is, obviously, particularly for the teen-agers, they will just
move over to the adult computers that do not have the filters on
them.
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This statute, even though it is entitled the Children’s Internet
Protection Act, obviously does seek to restrict funding of
unprotected pornography, obscenity, and child pornography for
adults as well.
MR. TIEN: I just wanted to underscore Ann’s point about the
right of minors to receive sexually explicit information. One of the
papers included here is a discussion of how, certainly for teenagers, probably from fourteen on, there is a very strong legal
argument that they have a right to receive all sorts of information
relating to reproductive choice, reproductive sexual health,
religious information, about their own sexual orientation and
identity, just coming directly out of the Court’s abortion cases,
which virtually require that minors have an ability to get that kind
of information.170
MR. LEWIS: But the filters do not—
MS. BEESON: Even against their parents’ consent.
MR. LEWIS: The filters can be tweaked so that, as I
understand it, you can check it off saying that sex education sites
are fine.171
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: I think we have run a little bit
over. We will have some announcements from our sponsor, from
the IPLJ, and then we will conclude.
I would just like to take a moment, though, to thank the panel
for doing a wonderful job.
MS. WARD:172 Good evening. My name is Jaclyn Ward. I am
the Editor-in-Chief of the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media
170

See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 69 (1983); Carey v.
Population Services Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 715 (1977); Catherine J. Ross, An Emerging
Right for Mature Minors to Receive Information, 2 U. PA J. CONST. L. 223 (1999)).
171
See Am. Library Ass’n v. U.S., 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 428–29 (2002) (describing
N2H2’s filtering software and explaining that “[w]hen an exception category is enabled,
access to any Web site or page via a URL associated with both a category and an
exception, for example, both ‘Sex’ and ‘Education,’ will be allowed, even if the customer
has enabled the product to otherwise block the category ‘Sex’”), prob. juris. noted, 123 S.
Ct. 551 (2002).
172
Jaclyn B. Ward, Editor-in-Chief, Fordham Intellectual Property, Media, and
Entertainment Law Journal, Fordham University School of Law. A.B., Harvard College,
1999; J.D. expected, Fordham University School of Law, 2003.
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and Entertainment Law Journal. I am so pleased that you all were
able to attend.
Before you leave to enjoy cocktails and hors d’oeuvres, I
would like to conclude by thanking today’s moderators and
panelists for their thoughtful, and at times spirited, exchange of
ideas.
I would also like to thank all the members of the Journal for
their support and their time, and I would like to thank our
moderators, Professor Hugh Hansen and Professor Joel
Reidenberg.
I would also like to especially thank David Perry-Campf. I
would like to extend a special acknowledgement to our
Symposium Editor, Kathy Bartlett. We are really grateful to have
her on our team. I thank her for envisioning this event and for
working so hard to ensure its success. Thank you and enjoy the
rest of the evening.

